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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 18-2298 
______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
 
v. 
 
GREGORY JOHN SCHAFFER, 
 
 Appellant 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
(D.C. No. 2:13-cr-00183-001) 
District Judge: Hon. Jose L. Linares 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 12, 2019 
______________ 
 
Before: MCKEE, PORTER, and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: June 24, 2019) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
 2 
 
 Gregory John Schaffer appeals his conviction for producing and possessing child 
pornography.  Schaffer sexually abused two minor children in locations including his 
house, his office, and hotel rooms.  He took pictures and appeared in videos of the 
assaults found on his laptop and external hard drive.1  Schaffer was charged with and 
convicted of two counts of production of child pornography2 and one count of possession 
of child pornography.3  He was sentenced to 480 months’ imprisonment.4   
I5 
 On appeal, Schaffer argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress images retrieved from his computer and external hard drive (collectively, the 
computer evidence).  He also argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion 
for a judgment of acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a).   
A.  MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Schaffer argues that the computer evidence should have been excluded because 
the government inexplicably lost his laptop, and that this loss was compounded by 
technical irregularities regarding the Government’s forensic examination.  He claims that 
the inability of Schaffer’s expert to examine the laptop abridged Schaffer’s Constitutional 
                                                 
1 The computer and hard drive contained at least five sexually explicit videos of 
Schaffer’s victims, nude photographs of one victim, and at least 85 other videos of 
underage boys and girls engaged in sexual activity.  The government states that the 85 
videos were the equivalent of 6,375 images of child sexual exploitation.  
2 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). 
3 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). 
4 This sentence was within the Guidelines range of 960 months.  Schaffer does not 
contest his sentence on appeal. 
5 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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rights to due process of law, confrontation, and the opportunity to present a meaningful 
defense.   
We disagree.  First, the computer evidence was preserved by an “exact copy,” a 
forensic image prepared by a federal digital forensics expert before the expert’s 
examination of the computer’s contents.  Second, even assuming that the forensic image 
did not afford Schaffer the equivalent level of information that the actual hard drive 
would have provided, Schaffer’s due process claim still fails.  Although loss or 
destruction of evidence may constitute a due process violation,6  “[a] defendant who 
claims destroyed evidence might have proved exculpatory . . . has to show the 
[government’s] bad faith in ordering or permitting its destruction.  Without a showing of 
bad faith, failure to preserve evidence that might be of use to a criminal defendant . . . is 
not a denial of due process.”7  To prove bad faith, there must be a “showing that the 
Government intentionally [acted] to gain some tactical advantage over [the defendant] . . . 
.”8  We review for clear error the District Court’s finding that the government did not act 
in bad faith.9   
                                                 
6 California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984) (“[E]vidence must both 
possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be 
of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by 
other reasonably available means.”). 
7 United States v. Deaner, 1 F.3d 192, 200 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Arizona v. 
Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988)). 
8 Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57 (quoting United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325 
(1971)). 
9 United States v. Zaragoza-Moreira, 780 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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Schaffer fails to demonstrate that the government acted in bad faith.  The 
unfortunate misplacement of Schaffer’s laptop does not constitute an intentional act to 
gain a tactical advantage over Schaffer.  Indeed, Schaffer himself told the District Court 
he “d[id] not question the veracity of the[] [government’s sworn] statements” about the 
loss of the laptop, and that “it is clear that the government did not act in ‘bad faith’ when 
it lost the laptop.”10   
This concession by Schaffer is supported by the government’s three sworn 
statements from the principal individuals who handled Schaffer’s laptop between the time 
it was examined and his trial.  Neither the agents who investigated Schaffer nor the 
Assistant U.S. Attorneys in New Jersey who prosecuted him had control over the laptop 
when it disappeared.  There was no animus toward Schafer.  Furthermore, it was “highly 
likely that all relevant evidence was preserved in the forensic images of the hard 
drive[].”11  The government gained no tactical advantage by losing a laptop that had no 
exculpatory value.  The District Court therefore did not err in denying Schaffer’s motion 
to suppress the computer evidence. 
B.  MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL 
Schaffer next contends that the District Court erred by denying his motion for a 
judgment of acquittal related to the production charges because there was no evidence he 
transferred images from a recording device to the computer or hard drive.  We exercise 
                                                 
10 Supp. App. 102. 
11 United States v. McNealy, 625 F.3d 858, 870 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 5 
 
plenary review over an appeal for a grant of a judgment of acquittal.12  The dispositive 
question for any claim regarding the sufficiency of the evidence is “whether, after 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of 
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”13  
When ruling on the motion, the District Court identified five pieces of evidence 
that the government could present to lead a reasonable jury to conclude Schaffer created 
the videos and images and then placed them on his laptop and hard drive.  That evidence 
was that (1) the sexually explicit videos of his victims were found on Schaffer’s laptop, 
(2) Schaffer’s laptop contained copies of the sexually explicit videos of one of his victims 
that also existed on Schaffer’s desktop computer, (3) the sexually explicit photographs 
that Schaffer took of one of his victims were found on Schaffer’s laptop, (4) Schaffer’s 
hard drive contained the sexually explicit videos of his victims, along with the sexually 
explicit photographs of one of his victims, and (5) a federal investigator testified that the 
sexually explicit videos of both victims, along with the sexually explicit photographs of 
one victim, among other files, were backed up from Schaffer’s laptop to Schaffer’s hard 
drive in May 2012, before investigators seized the laptop and desktop.   
Schaffer concedes that he took the images and participated in the inappropriate 
encounters with his victims but argues that the evidence detailed by the trial court did not 
                                                 
12 United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 424 (3d Cir. 2013) (en 
banc). 
13 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see also United States v. 
Johnson, 302 F.3d 139, 149 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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provide any direct link to suggest that he himself transferred recorded images to the 
laptop or the external hard drive.   
Schaffer’s argument that circumstantial evidence cannot prove his guilt is 
unpersuasive.  The government can meet its burden of proof by presenting circumstantial 
evidence as long as inferences drawn from that evidence “bear a ‘logical or convincing 
connection to established fact.’”14  The government has done so here.  Schaffer had 
exclusive control over the computer evidence.  That computer evidence contained child 
pornography created by Schaffer.  The jury could reasonably have inferred that Schaffer 
loaded the pornographic images of his victims onto his laptop and hard drive.  We 
therefore reject Schaffer’s claim.   
III 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
                                                 
14 Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d at 425 (quoting United States v. Cartwright, 359 
F.3d 281, 291 (3d Cir. 2004)). 
